When does State Interference with Property (now) Amount to Expropriation? An Analysis of the Agri SA Court's State Acquisition Requirement (Part I) by Marais, Ernst Jacobus
 
 
 
 
  Author: EJ Marais 
WHEN DOES STATE INTERFERENCE WITH PROPERTY (NOW) 
AMOUNT TO EXPROPRIATION? AN ANALYSIS OF THE Agri SA 
COURT'S STATE ACQUISITION REQUIREMENT (PART I) 
 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v18i1.02  
 
2015 VOLUME 18 No 1 
ISSN 1727-3781 
EJ MARAIS  PER / PELJ 2015(18)1 
 
2983 
 
WHEN DOES STATE INTERFERENCE WITH PROPERTY (NOW) AMOUNT TO 
EXPROPRIATION? AN ANALYSIS OF THE Agri SA COURT'S STATE 
ACQUISITION REQUIREMENT (PART I)* 
EJ Marais** 
1 Introduction 
Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) 
provides two ways in which the state may interfere with property rights, namely 
deprivation (section 25(1)) and expropriation (section 25(2)). According to section 
25(1) property may only be deprived in terms of law of general application, which law 
may not permit arbitrary deprivation. Section 25(2), in turn, stipulates that property 
may only be expropriated in terms of law of general application for a public purpose 
or in the public interest against payment of compensation. In its most basic form, 
deprivation entails limitations on the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property in 
the public interest – well-known examples include zoning laws, nuisance laws and fire 
regulations.1 The public interest in this regard mostly relates to the protection of public 
health and safety or the state's role in resolving civil disputes.2 Deprivation is sourced 
in the state's regulatory police power and usually affects large groups of people in 
society more or less equally. 3  For these reasons deprivations are normally not 
compensated.4 Expropriation, on the other hand, derives from the state's power of 
                                                          
*  Part II follows in the same edition of this journal.  
**  Ernst Jacobus Marais. BA LLB LLD (Stellenbosch University). Post-doctoral research fellow, 
University of Cape Town. E-mail: ejmarais@uj.ac.za. I would like to thank Proff André van der 
Walt, Hanri Mostert and Brendan Edgeworth for invaluable discussions and comments concerning 
various aspects of both parts of this article. I would also like to thank the two anonymous peer 
reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are my own. 
1  Sax 1964 Yale LJ 36-37, 62-63; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 195-197; Allen 
Commonwealth Constitutions 174-175, 179-180; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 
333-334. See also First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 
(CC) para 100; Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Provincial Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC) para 63. 
2  See the sources in the previous fn. See further s 2.3 of Part II of this article. 
3  See the sources referred to in fn 1 above.  
4  See, for instance, Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Provincial Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC) para 63 (South African law); Pennsylvania Coal Co v 
Mahon 260 US 393 (1922) 413 and Mugler v Kansas 123 US 623 (1887) 665 (both United States 
law), which confirm that the state may legitimately interfere with property rights – even drastically 
– through its regulatory police power without having to pay compensation for every infringement 
which diminishes established property values. 
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eminent domain and typically involves situations where the state acquires property 
from one person – or a small group of persons – for a public purpose or in the public 
interest, such as building roads or airports, upon which the affected owner(s) receives 
compensation.5  
Distinguishing between these two forms of state interference is easy in the examples 
mentioned. However, it becomes difficult when cases move into the "grey area" where 
deprivation starts to blur into expropriation.6 Indeed, taxation and criminal forfeiture 
are but two examples of property interferences which (based on their effects) seem 
to be more akin to expropriation than deprivation, since both entail involuntary losses 
of property to the state.7 Yet it would be pointless to regard them as expropriation 
which requires compensation.8 Properly classifying infringements that fall into this 
grey area is what presents challenges to constitutional property scholars. As only 
expropriation carries the obligation to pay compensation, there is an incentive for 
property holders to label any interference with their property as expropriation. For this 
reason it is crucial to have a principled distinction between these forms of limitation, 
especially in view of the dangers that uncertainty in this regard could hold for land 
reform initiatives in the South African context, where legitimate (but burdensome) 
regulatory measures could be challenged as amounting to expropriation which 
requires compensation. 
In the leading decision on the property clause, namely First National Bank of SA Ltd 
t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of 
SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance9 (FNB), the Constitutional Court laid down a 
                                                          
5  See the sources in fn 1 above. See further s 2.3 of Part II of this article. 
6  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 196-199. See also Allen Commonwealth Constitutions 
162-163. The distinction between deprivation and expropriation, in terms of their respective effects, 
is not always clear, hence the grey area. Deprivation is said to usually involve non-acquisitive 
interference with property, although it can in some instances result in the states acquiring property, 
while expropriation mostly entails state acquisition of property, though this (again) need not always 
be the case: see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 198-200. See further in this regard the 
discussions in ss 1.2-1.3 of Part II of this article. I expand on how this grey area may be understood 
in view of recent case law in fn 54 below. 
7  Sax 1964 Yale LJ 75-76; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 347-349; Allen Commonwealth 
Constitutions 162-163. 
8  Sax 1964 Yale LJ 75-76; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 335, 347-348; Allen 
Commonwealth Constitutions 163. 
9  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 46. The 
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methodology for deciding section 25 disputes. A central aspect of this methodology is 
the way in which the Court approached the distinction between deprivation and 
expropriation. Ackermann J distinguished between them by setting up expropriation 
as a smaller category that falls within the larger category of deprivation. According to 
this approach expropriation forms a subset of deprivation, which means that all 
expropriations are also deprivations though only some deprivations will amount to 
expropriations. For this reason the adjudication of all property disputes must start with 
section 25(1). If the infringement at hand does not satisfy the requirements for a valid 
deprivation10 and cannot be justified in terms of section 36(1), then that will be the 
end of the matter. The impugned law will be declared unconstitutional. The question 
whether or not the interference amounts to expropriation under section 25(2) will 
therefore not arise under these circumstances.11 Consequently, whether a property 
infringement amounts to either deprivation or expropriation has lost much of its 
significance in the wake of FNB, since distinguishing between them became relevant 
only at a later stage of the inquiry.12  
However, in subsequent cases13 the Constitutional Court indicated it will not always 
follow the FNB methodology strictly and that it is willing to go straight to the section 
25(2) question, should parties focus on the expropriation requirements. This approach 
underscores the importance of having a proper distinction between deprivation and 
expropriation, as such a distinction might now very well be the decisive factor in 
section 25 disputes. Indeed, this distinction is now even more prominent in view of 
                                                          
authority of FNB has been confirmed in a number of subsequent decisions of the Constitutional 
Court. See, for example, Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC); 
National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC); Haffejee v eThekwini Municipality 2011 
6 SA 134 (CC); Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Provincial Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC); Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC, Local 
Government and Housing, Gauteng 2005 1 SA 530 (CC). 
10  In other words, if the deprivation is not authorised by law of general application or if the authorising 
statute permits arbitrary deprivation of property: see s 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996. 
11  According to Roux "Property" 46-2–46-3, 46-19–46-20, 46-32 the "telescoping" effect of the non-
arbitrariness test in s 25(1) will prevent most (if not all) expropriation cases from ever reaching 
the s 25(2) stage of the inquiry. 
12  Roux "Property" 46-29; Van der Walt 2004 SALJ 867-869. See also Iles "Property" 534-535. 
13  Such as Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC); Haffejee v 
eThekwini Municipality 2011 6 SA 134 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC). 
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the Court's recent decision in Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy14 
(Agri SA). The applicant in this case argued that the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA; the Act), upon its commencement, effectively 
expropriated all mineral right holders of their pre-2002 mineral rights. As the parties 
to the case accepted that the deprivation caused by the Act amounted to non-arbitrary 
deprivation of property, the Court only had to decide if there was an expropriation of 
the applicant's mineral rights. Mogoeng CJ, writing for the majority, rejected this 
assertion by holding that the key characteristic that differentiates deprivation from 
expropriation is state acquisition of property.15 The fact that the state did not acquire 
"ownership" of (or at least the right to exploit) the affected mineral rights led the Court 
to conclude that there was no acquisition and hence no expropriation. 
Two aspects of this judgment require attention. Firstly, the Court decided there cannot 
be expropriation if the state does not acquire the substance or core content of the 
affected property. It is worth emphasising that most expropriations indeed result in 
the state acquiring property. However, the fact that acquisition is a general 
consequence of expropriation does not necessarily mean it is also an indispensable 
requirement for it. 16  The Constitutional Court's emphasis on this "requirement" 
therefore makes it necessary to clarify its meaning and role in our law. Secondly, the 
effect-centred nature of the Court's test17 to determine whether state acquisition (and 
therefore expropriation) took place or not appears incapable of coherently categorising 
property infringements that fall within the grey area mentioned earlier. It follows that 
there must be other reasons – besides the fact that acquisition occurred – why these 
interferences do not amount to expropriation.  
To address these two questions this article is divided into two parts. Part I investigates 
the meaning and role of state acquisition. It begins (in section 2) by setting out the 
changes introduced to the minerals regime by the MPRDA, after which the focus turns 
to the Constitutional Court's Agri SA decision and how it formulated the state 
                                                          
14  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC). 
15  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 58-59. 
16  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 197, 345. See also the discussion in s 1.2 of Part II of 
this article. 
17  I expand on this test in s 2.3 below. 
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acquisition requirement. Against this background section 3 analyses South African 
expropriation law up until Agri SA for the purposes of comparing how state acquisition 
(during that time) relates to the position in Mogoeng CJ's judgment. This investigation 
reveals that state acquisition, as formulated in Agri SA, probably has the same 
meaning as in pre-constitutional law, although it appears that it was never an absolute 
requirement for expropriation during that era. In this regard both pre- and (at least 
some) post-constitutional judgments – as well as Australian constitutional property 
law – reveal that merely inquiring whether or not the state acquired property for 
distinguishing between deprivation and expropriation is unable to produce reliable 
results in all instances.  
Part II of the article explains the shortcomings of only relying on state acquisition in 
the expropriation context. Section 1 (of that article) considers three scenarios which 
indicate why the acquisition of property by the state, on its own, is unable to properly 
distinguish between deprivation and expropriation. Against this background Part II 
proposes (in section 2) an alternative approach to Mogoeng CJ's approach, one which 
focuses on the purpose, as opposed to the effect, of the impugned statute to answer 
the expropriation question. To this end I rely on Harksen v Lane18 (Harksen) and also 
on Australian constitutional property law as influenced by the work of Sax.19 Section 
3 then summarises the conclusions drawn in the sections referred to. 
2 The Agri SA judgment 
2.1 Changes to the minerals regime 
It is necessary to first discuss developments surrounding the enactment of the MPRDA 
and the facts of the Agri SA case so as to understand Mogoeng CJ's judgment.20 This 
Act came into operation on 1 May 2004 and brought about a major "institutional 
                                                          
18  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC). 
19  I rely on Allen's view (Allen Commonwealth Constitutions 174-179) of how the theory developed 
by Sax 1964 Yale LJ 36-76 influenced the expropriation jurisprudence of the Australian High Court. 
See further s 2.3 of Part II of this article. 
20     A detailed discussion of the changes introduced by this Act, as well as the previous minerals 
regime, is beyond the scope of this article. For a more comprehensive discussion on this topic, see 
Mostert Mineral Law, especially ch 4-7. 
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regime change" in South Africa's mineral and petroleum law.21  The MPRDA was 
enacted in view of sections 2422 and 2523 of the Constitution, which mandate the state 
to realise certain reforms in the mineral sector.24  
The primary objectives of the MPRDA include bringing about "equitable access to and 
sustainable development of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources" and 
ensuring that "the nation's mineral and petroleum resources are developed in an 
orderly and ecologically sustainable manner while promoting justifiable social and 
economic development".25 To realise these purposes the Act introduced fundamental 
changes to the ways in which rights in mineral and petroleum resources may be 
acquired, held and exploited. Under the pre-200226 minerals regime these rights were 
traditionally held in private ownership, although even during this time they were 
subject to extensive state regulation.27 One of the central changes brought about by 
the MPRDA in this context is that it replaced the existing rights-based regime with a 
licence-based one.28 The Act affected this change by providing a process whereby 
holders of pre-existing mineral rights could convert these rights into so-called "new 
order" rights. In terms of Schedule II to the MPRDA pre-existing prospecting and 
mining rights, as well as unused mineral rights, remained in force after the 
                                                          
21  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 418. See also Mostert Mineral Law 78. 
22  See especially s 24(b)(iii) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 
(the MPRDA): "Everyone has the right– (b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of 
present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that– (iii) 
secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting 
justifiable economic and social development". 
23  See especially s 25(4)(a) of the Constitution: "For the purposes of this section the public interest 
includes the nation's commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access 
to all South Africa's natural resources". 
24  The purposes behind the Act are inter alia to give effect to the South African state's custodianship 
of the country's mineral and petroleum resources, to ensure ecologically sustainable development 
of these resources, to promote economic growth and mineral and petroleum resources 
development, to ensure that the nation's mineral and petroleum resources are developed in an 
orderly and ecologically sustainable manner while promoting justifiable social and economic 
development and to promote equitable access to these resources to all South Africans – especially 
those belonging to historically disadvantaged groups: see the preamble as well as s 2 of the MPRDA. 
These reformative goals must be understood against the backdrop of the social injustices that 
occurred in the mineral sector during apartheid, when non-white persons were excluded from 
partaking in and benefiting from the exploitation of South Africa's mineral wealth. 
25  See the preamble of the MPRDA as well as s 2(c) and 2(h) of the Act. 
26  I use the year in which the MPRDA was promulgated – as opposed to the year of its 
commencement – for the purposes of referring to the pre- and post-MPRDA minerals regimes. 
27  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 403-404; Mostert Mineral Law 78, 93-94, 113-115, 136, 
140; Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell LR 384-393. 
28  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 404. See also Mostert Mineral Law 113-115, 129. 
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commencement of the Act for certain periods of time.29 During these periods the 
holders of pre-existing mineral rights (which are referred to as "old order rights" under 
the post-2002 regime) were granted the opportunity to convert them into new order 
rights via a conversion process. If the holders of old order rights did not – or could 
not – apply for conversion before the expiration of the relevant deadline, the rights in 
question ceased to exist on that date.30  
Section 5(1) of the Act stipulates that new order prospecting and mining rights are 
limited real rights in respect of the mineral or petroleum and the land to which they 
relate. Yet, despite the real character of these rights they are generally understood to 
be weaker and "lesser" in content than their old order counterparts.31 Firstly, new 
order rights are – unlike old order rights – not perpetual in nature,32 since the MPRDA 
limits both their period of existence as well as the periods for which they may 
subsequently be renewed.33 While holders of unused old order mineral rights could 
freely transfer or encumber them during the pre-2002 regime (the ius disponendi),34 
new order prospecting and mining rights may be transferred or encumbered only with 
the written consent of the Minister.35 Furthermore, holders of unused old order rights 
lost the entitlement to sterilise the minerals to which these rights pertained by opting 
to leave them in the ground unexploited (the ius abutendi).36 In terms of Item 8(1) of 
                                                          
29  See Items 6-8 of Schedule II to the MPRDA. Old order prospecting rights remained in force for two 
years after the commencement of the MPRDA, old order mining rights for a period not exceeding 
five years, and unused old order rights for a period not exceeding one year. 
30  Item 8(4) of Schedule II to the MPRDA. 
31  Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell LR 397; Mostert Mineral Law 104-105, 113-115; Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 407-408. 
32  Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell LR 385, 397; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 407. 
See also Badenhorst 2013 THRHR 484-485. 
33  See ss 17-18 of the MPRDA for new order prospecting rights. Prospecting rights, once granted, 
are valid for up to five years. The holder of the prospecting right is allowed to apply for renewal 
at the expiration of this period. However, a renewed prospecting right may not exceed a period of 
three years. Ss 23-24 govern the position of new order mineral rights. A mineral right granted 
under the MPRDA is valid for up to 30 years. Mineral rights may be renewed for further periods, 
each of which may not exceed 30 years at a time. Prospecting and mining right holders obtain the 
exclusive right to apply for renewal of that right: see ss 19(1)(b) and 25(1) of the MPRDA 
respectively. For a more detailed discussion, see Mostert Mineral Law 82-84. 
34  Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell LR 397; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 407-408; 
Mostert Mineral Law 93, 140. See also Badenhorst 2013 THRHR 484-485. 
35  Section 11(1) of the MPRDA. Mostert Mineral Law 138, 141 thinks that when the MPRDA came into 
operation the holders of unused old order rights were from that moment unable to dispose of 
these rights before the completion of the conversion process.  
36  Mostert Mineral Law 93, 138-140, 142. See also Badenhorst 2013 THRHR 484-485 and Van der 
Vyver 2012 De Jure 135-136. 
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Schedule II to the MPRDA, holders of unused old order rights retained those rights for 
a maximum period of one year after the commencement of the Act. During this period 
the holders of these rights had the exclusive right to apply for the conversion of their 
rights into either new order prospecting or mining rights under the Act against 
payment of a non-refundable application fee.37 In the event of the holder of unused 
old order rights failing or being unable to make the necessary application before the 
expiration of the one-year period, those rights ceased to exist.38 Consequently, the 
holders of such old order rights no longer had the ius abutendi and therefore had to 
activate these rights within the allotted time or risk losing them. 
The effects that the MPRDA had on the mineral rights enjoyed by mineral right holders 
under the pre-2002 minerals regime, especially concerning the ius abutendi, could 
aptly be described as far-reaching. For these reasons Agri South Africa regarded the 
impact of the Act as amounting to an expropriation of old order mineral rights, 
especially in view of Item 12(1) of Schedule II to the Act, which stipulates that any 
person who can prove that his or her property has been expropriated in terms of the 
MPRDA may claim compensation from the state. Agri South Africa subsequently 
identified a "test case" to challenge the constitutionality of the Act, namely the facts 
surrounding Sebenza Mining (Pty) Ltd (Sebenza). 
2.2 The facts 
Sebenza was the holder of unused coal rights which it acquired in 2001 for an amount 
of R1 048 800. As stated in the preceding section, the previous minerals regime not 
only permitted mineral right holders to use, transfer or encumber their unactivated 
mineral rights as they saw fit but also to leave them unexploited if they preferred to 
do so. When the MPRDA came into effect Sebenza became the holder of unused old 
order coal rights on that date. According to Item 8(2) of Schedule II to the MPRDA 
Sebenza had the exclusive right to convert its old order coal rights into either new 
order prospecting or mining rights via the conversion process. Until Sebenza converted 
                                                          
37  Item 8(2) of Schedule II to the MPRDA read with ss 16(1)(c) (prospecting right) and 22(1)(c) 
(mining right). See also Mostert Mineral Law 139-140 for the requirements of the application 
process. 
38  See fn 30 above. 
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these rights into new order rights its old order rights effectively remained "in limbo". 
Sebenza was no longer entitled to leave its mineral rights unexploited as before nor 
was it allowed to transfer or encumber these rights until after they had been 
converted.39 In what followed Sebenza was – for reasons irrelevant to this discussion 
– placed under liquidation and could thus not lodge the application to convert its old 
order coal rights into new order rights. Sebenza's liquidators eventually attempted to 
sell its coal rights to another company. However, the sale was cancelled after it 
became apparent that Sebenza's mineral rights had ceased to exist upon expiration of 
the one-year period provided in the MPRDA.40 Agri South Africa subsequently took 
session of Sebenza's rights and claims for the purpose of challenging the 
constitutionality of the Act.  
Agri South Africa instituted proceedings in the North Gauteng High Court because of 
the alleged expropriation of Sebenza's coal rights after its claim for compensation was 
rejected by the Department of Mineral Resources. When the case came up for decision 
on the merits,41 the court a quo held that the MPRDA resulted in the expropriation of 
Sebenza's mineral rights and that it was therefore entitled to compensation.42 The 
Minister of Minerals and Energy, dissatisfied with this result, took the matter on appeal. 
In the Supreme Court of Appeal Agri South Africa changed its line of attack by arguing 
that the very enactment of the MPRDA – as opposed to the mere extinguishment of 
Sebenza's rights upon the expiration of the one-year period – resulted in the 
expropriation of all pre-2002 mineral rights in South Africa.43 Wallis AJ (on behalf of 
the majority) overturned the decision of the court a quo by holding that the Act did 
not result in expropriation, since Sebenza was not deprived of any "property" upon 
                                                          
39  According to s 11(1) of the MPRDA a new order prospecting or mining right cannot be encumbered, 
sold or transferred without the written consent of the Minister of Minerals and Energy. 
40  Section 8(4) of Schedule II to the MPRDA. 
41  Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2012 1 SA 171 (GNP). The first case on the 
matter, namely Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy; Van Rooyen v Minister of 
Minerals and Energy 2010 1 SA 104 (GNP), was decided on exception. 
42  Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2012 1 SA 171 (GNP). A discussion of this 
decision, as well as the one decided on exception, is beyond the scope of this article. For an 
analysis of these judgments see Van Niekerk and Mostert 2010 Stell LR 158-171; Mostert Mineral 
Law 126-154; Badenhorst and Olivier 2012 THRHR 329-343; Van der Walt Constitutional Property 
Law 430-451. 
43  Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA) para 4. 
EJ MARAIS  PER / PELJ 2015(18)1 
 
2992 
 
the commencement of the MPRDA.44 Agri South Africa, in turn, appealed to the 
Constitutional Court.  
2.3 The Constitutional Court judgment 
In the Constitutional Court Agri South Africa maintained the position it had adopted in 
the Supreme Court of Appeal and argued that even though the state – through 
enacting the MPRDA – had not acquired the exact mineral rights or entitlements lost 
by Sebenza, the Act extinguished Sebenza’s rights so as to release them for allocation 
by the state to third parties. 45  Against this background they regarded the 
extinguishment of entitlements enjoyed by pre-2002 mineral right holders as 
amounting to expropriation.  
To decide the section 25 dispute the Constitutional Court confirmed the FNB 
methodology by first considering if the affected interest amounted to constitutional 
property. Mogoeng CJ held that Sebenza's unactivated mineral rights 46  indeed 
constituted property for purposes of the property clause.47 However, the Court then 
went straight to the fifth phase of the methodology, namely whether the interference 
at hand amounted to the expropriation of property in terms of section 25(2), instead 
of first ascertaining whether the infringement amounted to a deprivation of property.48 
Indeed, Mogoeng CJ did not decide the section 25(1) question at all and merely 
assumed that the impact which the MPRDA had on Sebenza's mineral rights amounted 
to a non-arbitrary deprivation of property, as accepted by the parties in the case before 
him.49  
                                                          
44  Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA) para 85. For an analysis of 
this judgment see Badenhorst 2013 THRHR 472-490. 
45  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 56. 
46  Which included the entitlement not to exploit the minerals to which these rights relate. 
47  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 32-46. This finding is 
contrary to the ruling of Wallis AJ in Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 5 SA 
1 (SCA) para 85. 
48  Ascertaining whether the property interference amounts to deprivation in terms of s 25(1) 
constitutes the second phase in the FNB methodology: See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 46. As said in the introduction, this 
deviation from the FNB methodology is not new and corresponds to decisions such as Du Toit v 
Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) and Haffejee v eThekwini Municipality 2011 6 SA 134 
(CC), where the Constitutional Court also went straight to the s 25(2) question for similar reasons.  
49  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 50-53, 67-68. 
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Thus, the central question that confronted the Constitutional Court was whether or 
not the MPRDA resulted in a blanket expropriation of all pre-2002 mineral rights upon 
its commencement. Reliance was placed on the subset or sub-species approach laid 
down in FNB for the purpose of distinguishing between deprivation and 
expropriation.50 This dichotomy implies that there are elements which these two forms 
of state interference have in common, although certain characteristics apply to 
expropriation only. Against this background Mogoeng CJ identified three 
characteristics which – in his view – set expropriation apart from deprivation, namely 
(i) compulsory acquisition of property by the state, (ii) for a public purpose or in the 
public interest and (iii) against payment of compensation. The latter two points are 
uncontroversial, as they merely confirm the requirements in section 25(2).51 It is 
interesting, though, that the Court "returned"52 to state acquisition (as laid down in 
Harksen) as a requirement which applies to expropriation only, especially since 
Ackermann J's way of distinguishing between deprivation and expropriation seems to 
have watered down such a categorical distinction. 53  Nevertheless, it must be 
                                                          
50  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 57, cited with 
approval in Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 48. In this 
paragraph Mogoeng CJ found there is an overlap between deprivation and expropriation and that 
no bold line of demarcation exists between them. As stated in the introduction, this view regards 
expropriation as a subset of the larger category of deprivation – in other words all expropriations 
are also deprivations, though only some deprivations will be expropriations. 
51  When comparing s 25(1) and 25(2) it appears as if the only requirements that do not apply to 
deprivation are the public purpose or public interest requirement as well as the compensation 
requirement. However, Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 225-232 convincingly argues that 
the non-arbitrariness requirement in s 25(1) entails an implicit public purpose or public interest 
requirement. For a contrary view that does not regard the non-arbitrariness requirement in s 25(1) 
as being similar to the public purpose or public interest requirement in s 25(2), see Van der Vyver 
2012 De Jure 130. Van der Vyver's argument is unattractive, though. Firstly, it is overly formalistic 
in that it relies on a literalist interpretation (see Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 93-94, 
102-103) of the difference between the words "arbitrary" in s 25(1) and "public purpose" and 
"public interest" in s 25(2), especially when considering the meaning attributed to "arbitrary" in 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100: see Van 
der Walt Constitutional Property Law 228 and fn 108. Secondly, it disregards the position in foreign 
law discussed by Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 225-227, which shows that a valid 
public purpose is mostly required for regulatory deprivations even when a country's property clause 
might not mention this requirement at all (such as US law). See further Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC 
for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC) para 
63. 
52  The Constitutional Court first laid down state acquisition as an essential requirement for 
expropriation in Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC). 
53  Van der Walt 2004 SALJ 867-869. After FNB it was uncertain whether state acquisition was required 
for purposes of expropriation, as no explicit mention is made of it in s 25: see Van der Vyver 2012 
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emphasised that FNB's subset approach does not contradict the distinction in Harksen 
– it was therefore still possible for the Constitutional Court to regard state acquisition 
as one of the essential differences between deprivation and expropriation.54 Mogoeng 
CJ confirmed this view by ruling that even though deprivation encapsulates the 
extinguishment of a right, the same is "not necessarily true"55 for expropriation.56  
The fact that the Constitutional Court now regards state acquisition as the key 
distinction between deprivation and expropriation makes it necessary to ascertain the 
meaning of this requirement. Mogoeng CJ defined it as follows:  
[A] claimant must establish that the state has acquired the substance or core content 
of what it was deprived of. In other words, the rights acquired by the state do not 
have to be exactly the same as the rights that were lost. There would, however, have 
to be sufficient congruence or substantial similarity between what was lost and what 
was acquired. Exact correlation is not required. … There can be no expropriation in 
circumstances where deprivation does not result in property being acquired by the 
state.57 (Own emphasis.) 
In support of this finding the Court referred to section 25's reformative and protective 
roles and emphasised that the tension which exists between these two interests must 
be considered when interpreting the property clause.58 It specifically highlighted the 
public interest as including the nation's commitment to providing equitable access to 
                                                          
De Jure 131-133; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman 542; Van der Walt 
2002 THRHR 464-465. 
54  Van der Walt 2004 SALJ 867. According to Van der Walt (867) both Harksen and FNB seem to 
exclude any overlaps or grey areas in between deprivation and expropriation. Nevertheless, the 
distinction between these two forms of interference becomes blurred the moment when the 
difference between them pivots on the effect of the infringement rather than the authorising source: 
see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 198-200. The fact that the Agri SA court regards the 
effect of the property interference (ie whether or not state acquisition occurred) as the defining 
characteristic of expropriation therefore confirms the existence of a grey area in between these 
two infringement forms, since there are certain property interferences – such as taxation and 
criminal forfeiture – which are simply not easily categorised as either deprivation or expropriation 
based solely on their effects. See further the discussion in fn 6 above as well as s 1.3 of Part II of 
this article. Compare Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 
48, where Mogoeng CJ held that there is an overlap [or grey area] between deprivation and 
expropriation and that no bold line of demarcation exists between them. 
55  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 48. 
56  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 48 and 58, relying on 
Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) paras 31-33 and Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, 
Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC) para 64. 
57  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 58-59. 
58  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 60-63, citing First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) paras 49-50. 
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South Africa's natural resources – as espoused in section 25(4)(a) – and that one must 
be cautious not to over-emphasise private property rights at the expense of the state's 
social responsibilities. Mogoeng CJ held that while a too narrow meaning of acquisition 
might undermine the constitutional protection of property in terms of section 25(2), 
an "overly liberal" interpretation of this requirement could blur the line between 
deprivation and expropriation.59 Such a blurring, so the argument goes, poses a threat 
to the state's legitimate reform initiatives (such as the MPRDA) in that they may 
potentially be struck down for resulting in expropriation without compensation.  
For these reasons the Court found it necessary to attribute a so-called "proper 
meaning" to state acquisition when deciding section 25(2) cases, which meaning must 
be established on an ad hoc or case-by-case basis.60 In this respect Mogoeng CJ opted 
for a context-based inquiry to establish the meaning of acquisition, which inquiry 
depends on an interplay between various factors, namely  
 (i)  the source of the affected right;  
(ii)  the nature of the right;  
(iii)  the content of the right;  
(iv)  the measures taken to interfere with or preserve the essence of the affected 
right; and  
(v)  balancing individual property rights with the purpose behind the interference.61  
In terms of the latter factor it appears that "acquisition" will be interpreted more 
narrowly in cases concerning transformation-oriented legislation (such as the present 
one) than what might otherwise be the case.62 Indeed, the Agri SA court attached 
significant weight to this factor by finding that the state had to acquire ownership of 
                                                          
59  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 63, relying on the 
Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA) paras 23-24. 
60  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 60-72, citing Minister 
of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA) paras 23-24. Mogoeng CJ (para 64) 
specifically ruled against a "one-size-fits-all" approach for determining what acquisition entails. See 
Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 342-344 for criticism of using such an ad hoc approach. 
61  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 64-65, citing Minister 
of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA) paras 23-24. The first factor is 
analogous to one of the factors used in Australian law to establish whether there was an 
"acquisition" of property as meant in s 51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution (1900): see the 
discussion in s 3.4 below. 
62  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 65. 
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the mineral rights lost by Sebenza for the interference to amount to expropriation. 
The Court regarded the fact that the state was not entitled to exploit Sebenza's rights 
(ie did not have "ownership" of them) as central to why acquisition had not taken 
place.63 In this regard Mogoeng CJ drew a distinction between what happens when 
the state acquires "ownership" of mineral rights and when it acquires ownership of 
land for purposes such as building railways or hospitals. In other words, for there to 
be an expropriation the state must acquire ownership of or the right to exploit the 
affected property, at least when the purpose behind the deprivation is of a 
transformative nature.  
The Constitutional Court concentrated on the effect64 the MPRDA had on Sebenza's 
mineral rights to ascertain if acquisition – and therefore expropriation – took place.65 
The Court's context-sensitive inquiry was therefore essentially effect-centred, as it 
seems that it would have been satisfied in the present context if the MPRDA had the 
effect of vesting the right to exploit Sebenza's minerals in the state. Allen66 describes 
such an approach as the "legalist view of interpretation" in that courts – when deciding 
whether or not expropriation took place – will "not ask why the state acquire[d] the 
property, but merely whether the state has acquired the property". Mogoeng CJ 
concluded that even though the state was now the custodian of the country's mineral 
wealth, this had not resulted in it acquiring the substance of pre-2002 mineral rights 
from holders such as Sebenza.67 When the MPRDA came into operation it merely 
abrogated the entitlement to sterilise unused old order mineral rights as well as the 
                                                          
63  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 68-71.  
64  The effect that an infringement has on property already played an important role in categorising 
it as either deprivation or expropriation before Agri SA was decided: see Iles "Property" 538, who 
cites First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100; 
Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2011 1 SA 293 (CC) para 
41; Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC, Local Government and Housing, Gauteng 2005 1 SA 530 
(CC) para 45. 
65  Interestingly, Mogoeng CJ made scant reference to Item 12(1) of Schedule II to the MPRDA in his 
judgment and did not consider s 55 of the Act at all. This underscores the effect-based nature of 
the Court's approach to establish whether or not expropriation occurred.  
66  Allen Commonwealth Constitutions 163-164 (own emphasis). It is due to this interpretation of the 
difference between deprivation and expropriation that there is probably now (after the Agri SA 
judgment) a grey area between these two forms of state interference: compare Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 198-200 as well as the discussions in fns 6 and 54 above. 
67  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 71. 
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ability to freely dispose of those rights; it did not transfer those entitlements to the 
state. The Court reasoned that mineral right holders were still able to exercise other 
entitlements concerning the mineral rights, and that the abolition of the specified 
entitlements had not led to their acquisition by the state or anyone else.68 The MPRDA, 
so it was maintained, did not enable the state to exploit the affected rights. Against 
this background the Agri SA court ruled that the MPRDA had not resulted in the 
expropriation of Sebenza's mineral rights. 
3 The meaning and role of state acquisition 
3.1 Introduction 
In the wake of Agri SA there can (now) be no expropriation if the state does not 
acquire ownership of or the right to exploit the affected property, at least in cases 
where the impugned statute has a transformative purpose. It is therefore necessary 
to clarify the meaning and role of this requirement for future expropriation cases, 
especially since no express mention of it is made in section 25 of the Constitution.  
Mogoeng CJ relied on two decisions for the purposes of construing the acquisition 
requirement, namely Harksen and Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, 
Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government69 (Reflect-All). The Court's indirect 
reliance on pre-constitutional case law through Harksen makes it necessary to analyse 
these cases along with South African expropriation law prior to the coming into 
operation of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (Interim 
Constitution) and the final Constitution. After this discussion I briefly turn to how the 
Constitutional Court viewed state acquisition in Harksen and Reflect-All before 
examining how these judgments – as well as pre-constitutional law – relate to 
Mogoeng CJ's interpretation of this requirement. From this investigation it appears 
that how the Agri SA court interpreted state acquisition broadly relates to how it was 
                                                          
68  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 71: "But for sterilisation, 
the core right was left intact and capable of full enjoyment by those who wished to and were able 
to exploit it. Neither the state nor other entities or people acquired the rights to sterilise, 
monopolise the exploitation of minerals or sell, lease or cede Sebenza's old order rights on 1 May 
2004." 
69  Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 
2009 6 SA 391 (CC). 
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construed in pre-constitutional law. Against this background I rely on Australian 
constitutional property law to help establish the meaning of state acquisition. 
Interestingly, pre-constitutional law reveals that state acquisition (though a helpful 
indicator for deciding whether or not expropriation occurred) was never an absolute 
requirement for expropriation – a conclusion which is similar to the position in 
Australian law. In this sense acquisition now fulfils a more prominent role in South 
African law than was the case before the Agri SA judgment was handed down.  
3.2 Pre-constitutional expropriation law70 
To determine the meaning and role of state acquisition in the pre-constitutional era it 
is first necessary to establish the meaning of "expropriation" during this period. 
Expropriation has always been described as an original method of acquisition of 
ownership in South African law.71 The expropriated property vests in the state ex lege 
on the date of expropriation and without the co-operation of the previous owner. The 
state does not derive its title from that of the previous owner and therefore registration 
of ownership in the Deeds Office is not a requirement.72 The power to expropriate 
accrues to the state and it can be exercised only in terms of legislation which 
specifically authorises expropriation.73 In this regard it is said that every expropriation 
must rest upon a "legislative foundation,"74 which means that expropriation cannot 
                                                          
70  It must be emphasised that pre-constitutional decisions pertaining to the meaning of expropriation 
must be approached with circumspection when ascertaining the meaning of "expropriation" for 
purposes of s 25(2): see Van der Walt 2002 THRHR 469; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman 542. See also First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v 
Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 59. 
71  Section 8(1) of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 (the Expropriation Act) (see similarly s 10(1)(a) 
of the Expropriation Bill of 15 March 2013); Pretoria City Council v Modimola 1966 3 SA 250 (A) 
258; Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 4 SA 510 (T) 515; Stellenbosch Divisional 
Council v Shapiro 1953 3 SA 418 (C) 422-423; Kent v South African Railways 1946 AD 398 405-
406. See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 344-345; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman 173, 559; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 11, 64-65, 119; Van der Merwe 
Sakereg 294-295; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg LLD-thesis 6-7, 52. This position was confirmed in 
Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) paras 32-33. Sonnekus and Pleysier 2011 TSAR 603-607, 
however, are critical of describing expropriation is an original method of acquisition of ownership. 
72  Section 8(1) of the Expropriation Act; Government of the Republic of South Africa v Motsuenyane 
1963 2 SA 484 (T) 488; Stellenbosch Divisional Council v Shapiro 1953 3 SA 418 (C) 422-423; Kent 
v South African Railways 1946 AD 398 405-406. 
73  Pretoria City Council v Modimola 1966 3 SA 250 (A) 258; Joyce & McGregor Ltd v Cape Provincial 
Administration 1946 AD 658 671. See also Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 9-10, 49, 93 and Van der 
Walt Constitutional Property Law 343-344. 
74  Joyce & McGregor Ltd v Cape Provincial Administration 1946 AD 658 671. 
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take place in terms of the common law.75 The empowering statute must set out the 
circumstances, procedures and conditions under which expropriation may take place.76 
An act of expropriation which is not based on such legislation is void. 77  The 
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 (the Expropriation Act; the Act) is the main authority in 
this regard and applies to most expropriations,78 although it does not codify this field 
of law.79  
Most courts and academic commentators simply define expropriation as when an 
owner is deprived of property, which property then vests in the state or a juristic 
person on whose behalf the property was expropriated.80 The Expropriation Act does 
not provide a definition for "expropriation" and merely stipulates (in section 2(1)) that 
the relevant Minister may expropriate any property or take the right to temporarily 
use property for public purposes.81 The fact that the expropriatee loses rights in the 
property and that the expropriator subsequently acquires them was therefore 
regarded from early on as a general hallmark of expropriation.82 Defining expropriation 
                                                          
75  Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 1 SA 601 (KZP) para 81; Joyce & McGregor Ltd v Cape 
Provincial Administration 1946 AD 658 671. See also Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 49-50, 75; Van 
der Walt and Marais 2012 LitNet Akademies 304-305; Sonnekus and Pleysier 2011 TSAR 602-607. 
76  Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 9-10; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman 559.  
77  Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 49. 
78  Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 44-46, 51, 75; Van der Merwe Sakereg 292. 
79  Section 26(1) of the Expropriation Act, which provides that expropriation in accordance with other 
acts which authorise it is still possible. See similarly s 2 of the Expropriation Bill of 15 March 2013. 
80  Sections 8(1), 8(7) and 3(3) of the Expropriation Act (see similarly s 10(1)(a) of the Expropriation 
Bill of 15 March 2013); Tongaat Group Ltd v Minister of Agriculture 1977 2 SA 961 (A) 972; Pretoria 
City Council v Modimola 1966 3 SA 250 (A) 258; Wallis v Johannesburg City Council 1981 3 SA 905 
(W) 908-909; Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 4 SA 510 (T) 515; Minister van 
Waterwese v Mostert 1964 2 SA 656 (A) 667; Stellenbosch Divisional Council v Shapiro 1953 3 SA 
418 (C) 422-423; Fitchat v Colonial Secretary and Central South African Railways 1910 ORC 46 48. 
See also Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) paras 31-32. See further Badenhorst, Pienaar and 
Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman 102, 541, 563; Mostert 2003 SAJHR 572-573; Hopkins and 
Hofmeyr 2003 SALJ 51; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 61; Van der Merwe Sakereg 291; Southwood 
Compulsory Acquisition 14; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 437; Chaskalson and Lewis "Property" 31-14–31-15; 
Badenhorst 1989 THRHR 137; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg LLD-thesis 51-52, 66-67. However, 
Sonnekus and Pleysier 2011 TSAR 603-607 disagree with this view. According to these authors the 
act of expropriation entails the reclassification of the expropriated object from a res in commercio 
to a res publicae, which is res extra commercium and therefore not susceptible for private 
ownership. The authors therefore think it is incorrect to describe expropriation as "state acquisition 
of property", as the expropriated object is no longer "property" from the moment when the state 
expropriates it. 
81  The Expropriation Bill of 15 March 2013 defines "expropriation" as including the taking of a right 
to use a property temporarily and also states that "expropriate" has a corresponding meaning. 
82  Compare Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 77-78 
(Cameron J's minority judgment). 
EJ MARAIS  PER / PELJ 2015(18)1 
 
3000 
 
as state acquisition of property where the object of expropriation is ownership of land 
is understandable in view of the fact that expropriation is an original method of 
acquisition of ownership, since that which is lost by the expropriatee will normally be 
more or less similar to what is acquired by the expropriator. This position is exemplified 
by Tongaat Group Ltd v Minister of Agriculture83 (Tongaat), which is one of the most 
cited decisions regarding the meaning of expropriation.  
Tongaat concerned an appellant/expropriatee who wanted to claim additional 
compensation for losses he would suffer in future (after the expropriation took place) 
when the state eventually realised the purpose for which his property was 
expropriated.84 The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (as it then still was) 
therefore had to decide whether the meaning of "expropriation"85 in terms of the 
Expropriation Act 55 of 1965 extends to losses incurred by the expropriatee under 
these circumstances. Rumpff CJ rejected the appellant's argument and held that the 
"ordinary meaning" of expropriation applies in the present instance, which entails "'n 
handeling deur die Staat (of ander bevoegde instansie) waardeur o.a. grond van die 
eienaar ontneem word en die eiendom van die Staat word, en nie … gebruik ná 
onteiening nie".86 Consequently, expropriation entails situations where the state or 
someone else acquires the affected property and does not extend to the use of the 
property by the state after the expropriation took place. 
Even though expropriation mostly concerns the ownership of land, it must be 
emphasised that the state can also expropriate rights in land other than ownership. 
The Expropriation Act is somewhat misleading in this regard in that it defines 
"property" as meaning both movable and immovable property, which creates the 
                                                          
83  Tongaat Group Ltd v Minister of Agriculture 1977 2 SA 961 (A). Goldstone J relied on his decision 
to define expropriation: see Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 31 fn 16. See further the 
discussion of the Harksen judgment in s 3.3 below. 
84  The purpose behind the expropriation was to build an international airport. The appellant, whose 
land was expropriated, still owned properties adjacent to the expropriated land and feared that 
the value of these properties would depreciate once the airport became operational. He also feared 
that it would frustrate his efforts to develop these properties in future. 
85  In the context of loss "caused by the expropriation" in terms of s 8(1)(a)(ii) of the Expropriation 
Act 55 of 1965. 
86  Tongaat Group Ltd v Minister of Agriculture 1977 2 SA 961 (A) 972: "[A]n act by the State (or 
other competent authority) whereby the owner is deprived of inter alia land and it then becomes 
the property of the State, and … not use of the property after expropriation". (Own translation, 
original emphasis.)  
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mistaken impression that the objects of expropriation are limited to tangible things. 
Nevertheless, it is well established that property in this context includes ownership, 
limited real rights, and certain personal rights.87  The Expropriation Act expressly 
stipulates that upon expropriation of ownership in land all registered rights – except 
mortgage bonds – in that land remain in force until such time that these rights are 
also expropriated.88 Limited real rights, such as registered long-term leases89 and 
servitudes,90 thus remain in force after expropriation and have to be expropriated 
separately if the state wishes to have unburdened use of the land.91 The state is not 
confined to expropriating existing limited real rights in land; it can also appropriate for 
itself new limited real rights in land (such as servitudes) by way of expropriation.92 It 
is trite that expropriation also includes the power to take the right to use property 
temporarily.93  
                                                          
87  Wallis v Johannesburg City Council 1981 3 SA 905 (W) 910; Stellenbosch Divisional Council v 
Shapiro 1953 3 SA 418 (C) 422-423; Fitchat v Colonial Secretary and Central South African Railways 
1910 ORC 46 48. See also Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman 103 fn 131, 
559-560; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 63, 71-72; Southwood Compulsory Acquisition 47-48; 
Badenhorst 1989 THRHR 134-135. As ownership is a real right it follows that "what is expropriated 
in a given situation is, strictly speaking, not the land itself but the right of ownership or a limited 
real right in respect thereof": see Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman 103 
fn 131. The Expropriation Bill of 15 March 2013 addresses this inaccuracy by defining "property" 
as not being limited to land and that it includes a right in or to such property. 
88  Section 8(1) of the Expropriation Act. See similarly s 10(1)(d) of the Expropriation Bill of 15 March 
2013. 
89  eThekwini Municipality v Spetsiotis 2009 JOL 24536 (KZD). 
90  Fitchat v Colonial Secretary and Central South African Railways 1910 ORC 46. 
91  According to s 22 of the Expropriation Act unregistered rights in land come to an end when the 
ownership in the land to which they relate is expropriated. Yet, s 13(1) of the Act specifically 
protects the interests of an unregistered lessee by providing that he is "entitled to the payment of 
compensation as if his right … were a registered right … which was also expropriated on the date 
of expropriation". Consequently, the holder of an unregistered lease is entitled to compensation 
for expropriation when the lease is extinguished upon expropriation of the land to which the lease 
relates. Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 64, 68-70, 118, 164, 193-194 thinks that the extinction of 
unregistered rights other than leases in terms of s 22 is in conflict with s 25(2) of the Constitution 
for authorising expropriation without compensation. See similarly Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman 174 fn 347. Interestingly, s 12(1) of the Expropriation Bill of 15 March 
2013 remedies this "oversight" by providing compensation to all holders of unregistered rights 
upon expropriation of their rights. 
92  See, for example, Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 4 SA 510 (T) 515; Wallis v 
Johannesburg City Council 1981 3 SA 905 (W) 908-909. See also Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 61; 
Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg LLD-thesis 51. 
93  Section 2(1) of the Expropriation Act. Compare the definition for "expropriation" in the 
Expropriation Bill of 15 March 2013. For examples of cases see Du Toit v Minister of Transport 
2003 1 SA 586 (C); 2005 1 SA 16 (SCA); 2006 1 SA 297 (CC); Bodasing v South African Roads 
Board 1995 4 SA 867 (D). 
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It follows that expropriation usually entails situations where the state acquires rights 
in property. Hence it is understandable why authors and the courts use this description 
to explain what happens when the state expropriates ownership of land or movable 
objects. However, it is less clear what happens in terms of the acquisition explanation 
when the state expropriates limited real rights in land. This is an important question, 
especially since Agri SA concerned the alleged expropriation of old order mineral rights, 
which are limited real rights.94 A problematic example which comes to mind in this 
context is when the state owns land that is burdened with a long-term lease or a 
servitude and then decides to expropriate these rights. It cannot be said that the state 
"acquires" the rights or that they vest in the state by way of the original acquisition of 
ownership, as one cannot have a limited real right in your own property.95  
One of the few cases that sheds light on the meaning of expropriation in this context 
is Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 96  (Beckenstrater). Beckenstrater 
concerned the expropriation and appropriation by the state of "new" servitudes of 
abutment, storage and aqueduct over the applicant's land pursuant to the (previous) 
Water Act 54 of 1956 (Water Act). The applicant contended that the meaning of 
"expropriate" in section 94(1)97 of the Water Act did not encompass the attempted 
expropriation, as the section – so the argument went – allowed the state only to 
expropriate existing rights and not to create new rights (ie servitudes) through 
expropriation. Trollip J held as follows: 
[T]he ordinary meaning of 'expropriate' is 'to dispossess of ownership, to deprive of 
property' (see e.g. Minister of Defence v Commercial Properties Ltd. and Others, 1955 
(3) SA 324 (N) at p. 327G; but in statutory provisions, like secs. 60 and 94 of the 
Water Act, it is generally used in a wider sense as meaning not only dispossession or 
deprivation but also appropriation by the expropriator of the particular right, and 
                                                          
94  Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA) para 25, citing Van Vuren 
v Registrar of Deeds 1907 TS 289 295-296, where mineral rights are described as quasi-servitudes. 
This finding was not overruled by the Constitutional Court on appeal.  
95  D 8 2 26: Nulli enim res sua servit ("[F]or no one can have a servitude [or limited real right] over 
his own property": Hiemstra and Gonin Triligual Legal Dictionary 245. 
96  Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 4 SA 510 (T). Goldstone J relied on this judgment 
to describe the difference between deprivation and expropriation: see Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 
300 (CC) para 32. See further the discussion of the Harksen judgment in s 3.3 below. 
97  "An irrigation board may, with the consent of the Minister, and for the purpose of exercising any 
function or power or carrying out any duty assigned to or imposed upon it by this Act, expropriate 
any land or servitude over land or any existing right or appropriate any substance or material on 
any land or temporarily use any land or any waterwork within its irrigation district as it may 
consider necessary." (Own emphasis.) 
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abatement or extinction, as the case may be, of any other existing right held by 
another which is inconsistent with the appropriated right.98 (Own emphasis.) 
The court found that the servitudes to be acquired by the state are personal in nature 
and that nothing in section 94(1) prevents it from expropriating (by way of 
appropriation) new servitudes in the applicant's land for its own benefit. 99 
Consequently, it was held that the meaning of expropriation in the section specified 
extends to the appropriation – or "acquisition" – of new servitudes in the applicant's 
land and is not limited to the mere expropriation of existing servitudes (through their 
extinction).100  
What the state acquired in Beckenstrater are limited real rights in the form of 
servitudes. These limited real rights are roughly similar to what was lost by the 
expropriatee, namely entitlements to use and enjoy his land in certain ways, which 
entitlements would be in conflict with the state's exercise of its newly acquired 
servitudes. Even though what is acquired by the state is not exactly similar to what is 
lost by the expropriatee, it is trite that the state acquired property in the form of 
servitudes. 101  Such a conclusion corresponds with the principles of the original 
acquisition of ownership mentioned earlier, since what is acquired need not be exactly 
similar to what is lost.102 The principles of the law of servitudes also confirm this 
position in that the content of the entitlements that the servitude holder acquires need 
not necessarily be identical to the entitlements which the servient owner relinquishes 
or loses.103 In this regard the state's gain may be described as the correlative of the 
expropriatee's loss,104 since his ownership of the land is limited or diminished for the 
                                                          
98  Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 4 SA 510 (T) 515, quoted with approval in 
Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 32. 
99  Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 4 SA 510 (T) 515-517. 
100  Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 4 SA 510 (T) 516: "[T]he expression 'expropriate 
any servitude over land' in sec. 94 (1) was intended to cover not only the expropriation and 
extinction of an existing servitude, but also the expropriation and appropriation of a new personal 
servitude in favour of the Board". 
101  Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 2 SA 136 (C) paras 3-9, 19. 
102  Compare Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 58, quoted 
in s 2.3 above. 
103  Van der Merwe Sakereg 458: "[D]ie inhoud van die bevoegdhede van 'n serwituuthouer [is] nie 
noodwendig identies met die bevoegdhede wat die serwituutgewer afstaan … nie." 
104  I rely on Australian law for purposes of this explanation: see the discussion of Georgiadis v 
Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation 1994 179 CLR 297 in s 3.4 below and 
compare Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 58. 
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duration of the expropriated servitudes' existence.105 In other words, the expropriation 
resulted in a subtraction from the applicant's dominium.106 It therefore seems that the 
expropriation of new servitudes in land by the state also fits the state acquisition 
description.  
However, a vexing question is if Trollip J's dictum can be used to explain whether or 
not the expropriation of existing limited real rights (ie long-term leases and servitudes) 
held by others in land owned by the state also results in state acquisition of property. 
The expropriation of these rights is actually the other side of the Beckenstrater coin: 
instead of acquiring new limited real rights and limiting the expropriatee's use and 
enjoyment of his land, the state extinguishes existing limited real rights and 
subsequently obtains unburdened use and enjoyment of its land. Yet, as the state 
already owns the land to which the limited real rights relate, it may very well be asked 
if this benefit amounts to state acquisition of property. According to Van der Merwe107 
the servient owner's entitlements of use and enjoyment – as limited by the particular 
servitude – are merely suspended for the duration of the servitude's existence. In 
other words, they are inherently part of the servient owner's ownership and are 
therefore incapable of being split off from the ownership of the land so as to be "given" 
to the holder of the limited real right. 108  This view seems to imply that the 
expropriation of limited real rights held by others in land belonging to the state does 
not amount to state acquisition, as the entitlements are already "part" of the land, 
though they are but suspended. 
                                                          
105  Robarts v Antoni (SCA), unreported case number 327/2013 of 19 May 2014 para 17; Lorentz v 
Melle 1978 3 SA 1044 (T) 1049. See also Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman 321-322; Van der Merwe Sakereg 458-459, 464-467.  
106  Robarts v Antoni (SCA) unreported case number 327/2013 of 19 May 2014 para 17; Lorentz v 
Melle 1978 3 SA 1044 (T) 1049.  
107  Van der Merwe Sakereg 458-459.  
108  Van der Merwe Sakereg 458 critiques the view of Maasdorp Institutes 146, where the latter author 
defines a servitude as "a detachment of some of the rights of ownership from the ownership of 
some particular property and either conferring them upon a person other than the owner, or 
attaching them as an adjunct to the ownership of another separately owned property". According 
to Van der Merwe this argument is unsound, as it perceives ownership as a bundle of sticks where 
certain entitlements can be "split off" from ownership and "given" to someone else. Viewing 
ownership as a bundle of sticks is characteristic of Anglo-American law and is not adhered to in 
South African law, which regards ownership as a unitary concept: see Van der Merwe Sakereg 
173-176 and Van der Walt 1995 TSAR 20-24.  
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Yet, the essence of a limited real right is that the owner of the servient land is not 
allowed to interfere with the holder of the right's exercise of that right for the duration 
of its existence – the presence of the servitude limits the use and enjoyment of land 
by resulting in a subtraction from the dominium. Thus, upon extinguishment of the 
limited real right, ownership reverts back to its "full" or unencumbered extent.109 In 
terms of this description it is hard to escape the reality that what happens here 
essentially amounts to acquisition, since what the state (re)gains through 
expropriating the limited real right – namely having unencumbered use and enjoyment 
of its land – is the correlative of the expropriatee's loss.110 The expropriation of existing 
limited real rights through their extinguishment therefore also appears to fit the 
definition of state acquisition.111  
From the brief analysis of pre-constitutional expropriation law it follows that state 
acquisition was recognised early on as a general characteristic of expropriation.112 The 
acquisition description explains what happens when the state expropriates the 
ownership of land and also shows that the expropriation of limited real rights (either 
through their creation or extinguishment) amounts to state acquisition of property. 
This conforms to the position in legal literature, as most commentators think that the 
mere extinguishment of rights without some transfer to – or vesting of such rights in 
– the state does not result in expropriation. 113  However, pre-constitutional 
                                                          
109  Van der Merwe Sakereg 458. 
110  Compare the Australian decision of Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications 
Corporation 1994 179 CLR 297, which is discussed in s 3.4 below. 
111  This conclusion finds support in Australian law: compare Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v The 
Commonwealth of Australia 1994 179 CLR 155, which is discussed in s 3.4 below. 
112  Compare Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 77-78 
(Cameron J) and 102-105 (Froneman J). However, some authors think that state acquisition was 
already a requirement (and not just a general hallmark) for expropriation in pre-constitutional 
expropriation law: see Mostert Mineral Law 112-123; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman 541.  
113  Iles "Property" 549; Mostert Mineral Law 122-123 fn 50, citing Apex Mines Ltd v Administrator, 
Transvaal 1988 3 SA 1 (A); Van der Vyver 2012 De Jure 131; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 8, 26-27, 
62, citing Elektrisiteitsvoorsieningskommissie v Fourie 1988 2 SA 627 (T) 637; Southwood 
Compulsory Acquisition 14-15; Chaskalson and Lewis "Property" 31-14–31-15; Jacobs Law of 
Expropriation 42; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg LLD-thesis 7, 51-52, 66-67. This is also the position 
in case law, see Tongaat Group Ltd v Minister of Agriculture 1977 2 SA 961 (A) 972; Beckenstrater 
v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 4 SA 510 (T) 515; Minister van Waterwese v Mostert 1964 2 
SA 656 (A) 667. Mogoeng CJ confirmed this view in Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and 
Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 48 (footnote omitted), where he held that "[w]hereas deprivation 
always takes place when property or rights therein are either taken away [ie extinguished] or 
significantly interfered with, the same is not necessarily true of expropriation". However, Van der 
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expropriation cases and the views of academic commentators might create the 
erroneous impression that whether or not expropriation occurred depends solely on 
whether the state acquired property. One cannot ignore the specific contexts within 
which cases like Tongaat and Beckenstrater were decided – both judgments dealt with 
the interpretation of "expropriation" in legislation that explicitly empowered the state 
to expropriate property. The fact that the state acquired property in the process is 
therefore merely the result of and not the cause for a valid expropriation. Stated 
differently, state acquisition is a consequence of a valid expropriation rather than a 
pre-requisite for it in these cases. Furthermore, it is worth repeating that the power 
to expropriate (at least in pre-constitutional law) is sourced in legislation which 
specifically empowers the state to expropriate property. It is therefore conceivable, 
though I have been unable to find any examples in South African law, that empowering 
legislation could authorise the state to extinguish or destroy property through 
expropriation without it acquiring anything in the process. 114  This hypothetical 
example confirms that whether expropriation took place or not does not depend on 
the effect of the infringement but rather on whether or not the empowering source 
authorises it. 
Still, it is trite that most expropriations result in the state acquiring property. State 
acquisition is therefore a useful factor when having to categorise property 
infringements, especially if it is unclear whether or not the empowering statute 
authorises expropriation. However, care must be taken not to conflate the cause-
question (does the empowering statute authorise expropriation?) with the effect-
question (did state acquisition occur?). The fact that the state acquired property is 
                                                          
Walt Constitutional Property Law 197, 345 expresses the opinion that the destruction of property 
can amount to expropriation. See also Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman 
102 fn 125, 541-542 and Van der Vyver 2012 De Jure 131-133, who question if vesting is a 
requirement for expropriation under s 25, since the words "compulsory acquisition" do not appear 
anywhere in the provision. See further Van der Walt 2002 THRHR 464-465; Mostert 2003 SAJHR 
572-573, 575-577.  
114  See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 197, 345, which is discussed in the previous fn. It 
seems that Van der Vyver 2012 De Jure 131-133 also thinks it is possible to have expropriation 
without the state acquiring anything in the process.  
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indicative that expropriation might have taken place, though it does not categorically 
mean that the infringement amounts to expropriation.115  
3.3 The constitutional era 
Harksen was the first decision during the constitutional era that considered the 
meaning of expropriation. Here the Constitutional Court was called on to decide if 
section 21(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (Insolvency Act) complied with section 
28(3)116 – the expropriation provision – of the Interim Constitution. Section 21(1) 
provides that upon the sequestration of an insolvent spouse's estate the property of 
the solvent spouse vests in the Master of the High Court and, on appointment, in the 
trustee of the insolvent estate until such property is released. The applicant argued 
that this vesting of her property amounted to uncompensated expropriation contrary 
to section 28(3). The Court therefore had to decide whether or not the application of 
section 21(1) amounted to expropriation of the solvent spouse's property. 
Goldstone J confirmed that expropriation is an original method of acquisition of 
ownership by approving its pre-constitutional definition.117 In this sense the Court 
found that "expropriate" is "generally used in our law to describe the process whereby 
a public authority takes property (usually immovable) for a public purpose and usually 
against payment of compensation".118  However, it then acknowledged that even 
though expropriation constitutes a form of deprivation, 119  there is an important 
difference between these two forms of state interference. Goldstone J described this 
difference as follows: 
The distinction between expropriation (or compulsory acquisition as it is called in 
some other foreign jurisdictions) which involves acquisition of rights in property by a 
                                                          
115  Compare Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 197, 345. See further s 1.2 of Part II of this 
article. 
116  "Where any rights in property are expropriated pursuant to a law … such expropriation shall be 
permissible for public purposes only and shall be subject to the payment of agreed compensation 
or, failing agreement, to the payment of such compensation and within such period as may be 
determined by a court of law as just and equitable".  
117  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 31, citing Tongaat Group Ltd v Minister of Agriculture 
1977 2 SA 961 (A) 972, which is quoted in s 3.2 above.  
118  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 31, citing Tongaat Group Ltd v Minister of Agriculture 
1977 2 SA 961 (A) 972 and Davies v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development 1997 
1 SA 228 (ZS) 232. Compare the discussion in s 3.2 above. 
119  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 32. 
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public authority for a public purpose and the deprivation of rights in property which 
fall short of compulsory acquisition has long been recognised in our law.120 (Own 
emphasis.) 
In this dictum the Court made three findings: it confirmed that the objects of 
expropriation are rights in property and not the tangible things (such as land) to which 
these rights relate,121 it laid down state acquisition as the defining characteristic which 
sets expropriation apart from deprivation, and also held that deprivation does not 
entail the acquisition of property by the state. The first finding is uncontroversial in 
that it corresponds to pre-constitutional law.122 However, both the latter two rulings 
are problematic.123 The finding concerning the role of state acquisition differs from 
pre-constitutional law, where it appears to have been only an explanation or general 
hallmark for expropriation rather than a pre-requisite for it. In this regard Goldstone J 
cited the two pre-constitutional decisions discussed in the preceding section,124 neither 
of which provides authority for such a conclusion. The fact that the Court relied on 
Tongaat is understandable to a certain degree, as the affected interest in that case 
was – like the case before him – ownership. Beckenstrater, on the other hand, 
concerned the appropriation of limited real rights as opposed to the acquisition of 
                                                          
120  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 32, citing Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 
1964 4 SA 510 (T) 515 and quoted with approval in Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and 
Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 58. 
121  See further fn 87 above as well as the surrounding main text. 
122  Under the Constitution "property" will most probably also include ownership, limited real rights 
and certain personal rights: see the discussion in s 3.2 above as well as Agri South Africa v Minister 
for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 58. See also the definition of "property" in the 
Expropriation Bill of 15 March 2013. See further National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 
1 (CC) paras 57-64 (this judgment is analysed by Marais 2014 SALJ 215-233) as well as the position 
in Australian law discussed in s 3.4 below.  
123  I expand on these two problems in ss 1.2-1.3 of Part II of this article. 
124  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) referred to Tongaat in para 31 fn 16 and quoted from 
Beckenstrater in para 32. The Constitutional Court relied on four judgments for the purposes of 
construing the state acquisition requirement, namely the two pre-constitutional South African cases 
just referred to, two from the Zimbabwe Supreme Court (Hewlett v Minster of Finance 1982 1 SA 
490 (ZS) and Davies v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development 1997 1 SA 228 (ZS)) 
and one from the Supreme Court of India (HD Vora v State of Maharashtra 1984 AIR 866 (SC)). I 
do not analyse the two Zimbabwean judgments, as a discussion of Zimbabwean expropriation law 
is beyond the scope of this article. It is, however, unnecessary to analyse HD Vora, as it did not 
concern the distinction between deprivation and expropriation but rather the difference between 
expropriation (or compulsory acquisition) and requisitioning, which is a form of temporary 
dispossession of tangible property for use by the state during war or an emergency situation: see 
Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 336 fn 83; Van der Walt and Botha 1998 SAPL 20 fn 
9. See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 336 fn 83, 485-489, Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 152-153 and Van der Walt and Botha 1998 SAPL 20-22 for criticism of 
Goldstone J's reliance on the HD Vora and Zimbabwean cases. 
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ownership, which makes it less relevant. Still, the main reason why Goldstone J's 
reliance on these cases is questionable is the fact that both judgments dealt with acts 
which, unlike the Insolvency Act, explicitly authorise expropriation. Be that as it may, 
the Harksen court made it clear that state acquisition is the main difference between 
deprivation and expropriation, even though section 28(3) of the Interim Constitution 
– just like section 25(2) of the Constitution – does not cite it as a requirement for 
expropriation at all. Finally, describing deprivation as never resulting in state 
acquisition of property is overly simplistic, as there are instances of deprivation where 
the state does acquire property without the consent of the owner.125 
Yet, despite the greater emphasis on state acquisition, Goldstone J added two 
qualifications to the expropriation inquiry that are not found in pre-constitutional law. 
They are (i) the broad context and purpose of the impugned provision as a whole and 
(ii) the permanence of the transfer.126 It is interesting that the Court focused on the 
purpose of the impugned provision, as this consideration recognises the fact that the 
difference between deprivation and expropriation is not as straightforward as merely 
ascertaining if the state acquired property.127 Moreover, it is analogous to the pre-
constitutional authorisation requirement, which also considers the source of the 
infringement to establish whether expropriation took place. However, setting 
permanence as one of the qualifications is problematic, as foreign law shows that 
expropriations can, at least in some instances, be of temporary duration.128 Still, the 
permanence of the transfer takes into account the effect of the infringement in 
determining whether or not expropriation occurred, which correlates with the 
requirement that the state has to acquire property for there to be expropriation. 
                                                          
125  Examples include taxation and criminal forfeiture: see the introduction as well as s 1.3 of Part II 
of this article. 
126  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) paras 35-36. 
127  See s 1 of Part II of this article. I expand on the significance of Goldstone J's purpose-based 
approach in s 2 of Part II of this article.  
128  Allen Commonwealth Constitutions 167, citing Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel 1944 68 CLR 
261; Van der Walt and Botha 1998 SAPL 22-23, citing Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel 
1920 AC 508. See also Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman 542; Hopkins 
and Hofmeyr 2003 SALJ 50-51; Roux "Property" 46-31. See further s 2(1) of the Expropriation Act 
and compare the definition for "expropriation" in the Expropriation Bill of 15 March 2013. 
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The Constitutional Court held that even though the effect of section 21(1) might be to 
"transfer" ownership of the applicant's property to the Master and, upon appointment, 
to the trustee, this transfer did not amount to expropriation.129 Goldstone J based this 
finding on the fact that the purpose and effect of section 21(1) is "clearly not to divest, 
save temporarily, the solvent spouse of the ownership of property that is in fact his or 
hers … [and] to ensure that the insolvent estate is not deprived of property to which 
it is entitled". 130  It is unclear why the Court did not consider the authorisation 
requirement, especially given the fact that it probably would have confirmed the 
expropriation finding.131 Still, the Court should be commended for not limiting the 
expropriation question to whether or not the state acquired property, as such an 
approach might very well have caused it to find that section 21(1) did result in 
expropriation of the applicant's property. 
The Constitutional Court subsequently narrowed its expropriation investigation in 
Reflect-All. This case concerned the constitutionality of section 10(1) and (3) of the 
Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act 8 of 2001 (Gauteng Transport Infrastructure 
Act), which placed certain limitations on the use and enjoyment of the applicants' land. 
The applicants argued that the deprivation caused by this provision amounted to 
uncompensated expropriation of their property. Nkabinde J, relying on the dictum 
from Harksen quoted above, held that courts should be "cautious" to extend the 
meaning of expropriation to situations where the infringement does not result in the 
state acquiring the affected property.132 In this instance the Court concentrated on 
the effect the deprivation had on the affected owners to decide whether or not the 
                                                          
129  The Constitutional Court did not make a pronouncement on whether s 21(1) had the effect of 
actually transferring ownership of the solvent spouse's property to the Master (and later the trustee) 
and merely assumed that this was the case: see Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 30, 
citing De Villiers v Delta Cables (Pty) Ltd 1992 1 SA 9 (A). 
130  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 35, citing Van Schalkwyk v Die Meester 1975 2 SA 508 
(N) 510.  
131  The Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 does not set out the circumstances, procedures or conditions 
through which property may be expropriated and also does not provide for compensation, all of 
which count against viewing s 21(1) as resulting in expropriation. It is worth emphasising that 
there is a rebuttable presumption that a statute does not authorise expropriation if it does not 
explicitly provide for compensation: see Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 13, 18, citing Blackmore v 
Moodies GM and Exploration Company Limited 1917 AD 402 416-417 and Union Government v 
Schierhout 1925 AD 322 348. See also Belinco (Pty) Ltd v Bellville Municipality 1970 4 SA 589 (A) 
597. 
132  Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 
2009 6 SA 391 (CC) para 64. 
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impugned section amounted to expropriation. It subsequently held that the application 
of section 10(1) and (3) did not amount to expropriation, as it did not result in a 
transfer of the affected rights to the state. Nkabinde J made it clear that infringements 
which only limit or extinguish property rights without concomitant acquisition by the 
state cannot amount to expropriation under section 25(2).  
One is struck by the fact that the Reflect-All court only looked at the effect that the 
impugned provision had on the applicants' property to decide if expropriation had 
taken place. Indeed, the Court did not in any way refer to or consider any of the two 
qualifications laid down in Harksen, nor did it rely on the pre-constitutional 
authorisation requirement. Interestingly, the Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act 
does set out the procedures, circumstances and conditions through which 
expropriation may take place and also provides for compensation, 133  which 
complicates the question whether the infringement amounts to expropriation. Still, 
Nkabinde J's approach towards the expropriation question denotes one of two things, 
namely that (i) the two "additional" qualifications set out by Goldstone J will be 
considered only if the state actually acquired property (as was assumed in Harksen) 
or that (ii) the Constitutional Court might choose to base this inquiry solely on the 
state acquisition requirement. Indeed, the chances are that the latter approach might 
be followed in future, which conclusion is strengthened when one considers the Agri 
SA court's effect-centred test to decide the expropriation question.  
The Agri SA court confirmed the centrality of state acquisition, as laid down in Harksen 
and later acknowledged in Reflect-All.134 In this sense Mogoeng CJ, like Goldstone J 
and Nkabinde J, did not refer to or consider the authorisation requirement at all. Yet, 
the Court affirmed that expropriation is an original method of acquisition of ownership 
by finding that the property rights acquired by the state do not have to be exactly the 
same as the rights that were lost by the expropriatee to satisfy the acquisition 
requirement.135 The fact that Mogoeng CJ requires substantial similarity between what 
                                                          
133  See part 3 of the Act. 
134  See s 2.3 above. As stated in the main text surrounding fns 124-125 above, this differs from the 
position in pre-constitutional law. 
135  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 58-59. In this regard 
Mogoeng CJ, like Goldstone J in Harksen, also confirmed that the objects of expropriation are 
rights in property: see fn 122 above. 
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is lost and what is acquired for the purpose of determining state acquisition supports 
the argument that the expropriation of limited real rights (like servitudes) results in 
state acquisition of property.136  
However, the factors provided for establishing whether or not state acquisition – and 
therefore expropriation – took place are new and are not found in either the pre- or 
post-constitutional law. 137  In this sense the Court deviated from Harksen by  
considering the purpose of the MPRDA only to establish the meaning of state 
acquisition instead of using it to ascertain whether the interference amounted to 
expropriation. These are two separate questions which should not be confused – using 
the purpose behind the impugned statute to establish whether expropriation took 
place is not the same as relying on the purpose to establish the meaning of state 
acquisition (ie the effect that the interference must have for it to amount to 
expropriation). Though the purpose behind the impugned statute was taken into 
account in Agri SA it played a secondary role, in that Mogoeng CJ used the Act's 
purpose only to establish the meaning of state acquisition in the case before him. It 
thus appears that state acquisition will be interpreted more strictly when the purpose 
is of a transformation-oriented nature. Indeed, on the facts before it the Court held 
that the state had to acquire ownership of or the right to exploit the mineral rights for 
there to be state acquisition. The Court concluded that the interference did not amount 
to the expropriation of property, as the state had not acquired the right to exploit the 
mineral rights held by Sebenza. Yet, closer examination reveals that this finding might 
not be as self-evident as it prima facie appears, since the state did acquire the benefit 
of being able to grant new rights in minerals upon the extinguishment of the 
unconverted old order rights in those minerals, which benefit could potentially satisfy 
the state acquisition requirement.138 
                                                          
136  The fact that exact correlation is not required between what was lost and what is acquired (see 
Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 58) strengthens this 
argument. Compare the discussion in the main text surrounding fns 96-113 above. 
137  These factors appear in the main text surrounding fn 61 above. 
138  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 80-81. Compare 
Badenhorst 2014 THRHR 328-329 and Badenhorst and Mostert 2004 Stell LR 49-50. This matter 
is discussed in more detail in ss 1.4 and 2.3 of Part II of this article.  
EJ MARAIS  PER / PELJ 2015(18)1 
 
3013 
 
It therefore seems as if the meaning that the Agri SA attached to this requirement 
generally corresponds to its pre-constitutional definition, despite the different role 
state acquisition now fulfils.139 It has been seen140 that state acquisition encapsulates 
the expropriation of both ownership and limited real rights (and probably personal 
rights as well), be it either through their extinguishment or creation. The fact that 
Mogoeng CJ requires there to be substantial similarity between what was lost and 
what is acquired probably means that the courts will adhere to the pre-constitutional 
meaning of state acquisition, even though this might not be the case regarding its role 
in the pre-constitutional era.  
It is therefore trite that the expropriation of ownership or the right to exploit property 
will amount to state acquisition, at least when the impugned statute is aimed at 
transformation. In the context of cases such as Tongaat, Beckenstrater and especially 
Harksen, which is a decision from the constitutional era, it seems that a similar 
meaning might be attributed to this requirement even in cases which concern 
"normal," non-reformative legislation.141 However, matters are complicated by the 
other four factors142 Mogoeng CJ listed for the purpose of establishing the meaning of 
acquisition, which the Court – oddly – did not seem to use in deciding whether or not 
state acquisition actually accurred. In view of these considerations the last section of 
Part I of this article provides a brief overview of the acquisition requirement in 
Australian constitutional property law. Legal comparison with Australian law in this 
context is useful for two reasons. Firstly, Australian law developed a nuanced meaning 
for acquisition, one which broadly conforms to the one afforded to state acquisition in 
pre-constitutional law, and which explains many of the uncertainties touched upon 
earlier.143 Secondly, it is as yet unclear how South African courts will use the particular 
four factors to ascertain the meaning of state acquisition in a given case. In this regard 
Mogoeng CJ's first factor bears a striking resemblance to one of the factors that the 
                                                          
139  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 58, citing with approval 
the findings in Harksen which are referred to earlier in this section. 
140  See s 3.2 above. 
141  Compare Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 30. 
142  They are (i) the source of the affected right, (ii) the nature of the right, (iii) the content of the 
right, and (iv) the measures taken to interfere with or preserve the essence of the affected right. 
143  See the main text surrounding fns 96-113 above. 
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Australian High Court uses to establish whether acquisition took place or not, namely 
the source of the affected property right.  
3.4 The meaning and role of "acquisition" in Australian constitutional 
property law144 
Section 51(xxxi)145 of the Commonwealth Constitution 1900 (the Constitution) confers 
the power on the Federal – or Commonwealth – Parliament to make laws with respect 
to the "acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose 
in respect of which the Parliament has the power to make laws". The section uses the 
term "acquisition" instead of "expropriation"146 and stipulates that "just terms"147 are 
required only for property interferences which amount to the acquisition of property.148 
Section 51(xxxi) – and therefore the just terms guarantee – applies only to acquisitions 
by the Commonwealth and not to acquisitions by the different states.149 The Australian 
property clause also concerns federal legislation which provides for the acquisition of 
property by a person other than the Commonwealth or one of its agents.150 It follows 
                                                          
144  The door to legal comparison with this jurisdiction was opened in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) paras 76-83, where Ackermann J discussed 
Australian law for the purpose of deciding the property dispute at hand. For a more comprehensive 
discussion of this legal system, see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 39-72.  
145  Section 51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution (1900) has the status of a constitutional 
property guarantee, even though it does not appear in a bill of rights but rather in a part of the 
Constitution which concerns the legislative powers of the Commonwealth: see Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Clauses 39, 41. On the status of s 51(xxxi) as a property guarantee, see 
JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia 2012 HCA 43 para 41 per French CJ; 
Theophanous v The Commonwealth 2006 225 CLR 101 112-113 per Gleeson CJ; Mutual Pools & 
Staff Pty Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia 1994 179 CLR 155 168 per Mason CJ and 184 
per Deane J and Gaudron J; Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation 
1994 179 CLR 297 303 per Mason CJ, Deane J and Gaudron J and 320 per Toohey J; Re Director 
of Public Prosecutions; Ex Parte Lawler 1994 179 CLR 270 283 per Deane J and Gaudron J. 
146  This corresponds to the position in other Commonwealth countries: see, for instance, s 16(1) of 
the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1980 and s 13(2) of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, 1957. 
147  "Just terms" may, for the present purposes, be understood as meaning "compensation": see Van 
der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 58-60. Compare Allen 2000 Sydney LR 369-370. 
148  Even though s 51(xxxi) does not explicitly refer to the state's police power to limit the use, 
enjoyment and exploitation of property without compensation, it appears that the power to 
regulate or deprive property inherently vests in the Commonwealth and that it must be exercised 
in the public interest: see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 46-48. See also Mutual 
Pools & Staff Pty Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia 1994 179 CLR 155 180 per Brennan J 
and 189-190 per Deane J and Gaudron J. 
149  PJ Magennis Proprietary Limited v The Commonwealth 1949 80 CLR 382.  
150  PJ Magennis Proprietary Limited v The Commonwealth 1949 80 CLR 382 401-402 per Latham CJ, 
411 per Dixon J, 422-423 per Williams J and 429-430 per Webb J; Australian Tape Manufacturers 
Association Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia 1993 177 CLR 480 510-511 per Mason CJ, 
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that "acquisition" is an indispensable requirement for there to be "expropriation" in 
Australian law, which position is comparable to South African law after the Agri SA 
judgment.  
To ascertain if an acquisition occurred, it must first be established if the affected 
interest amounts to property.151 In this context the Australian High Court has made it 
clear that "property" will be interpreted widely so as to include ownership, limited real 
rights as well as certain personal rights in both tangible and intangible objects.152 If 
the affected interest is indeed constitutional property, the inquiry then proceeds to 
whether or not there was an acquisition of property. Acquisition in this context is not 
limited to the physical taking of property,153 although it neither encompasses any 
extinguishment, modification or deprivation of property rights.154 The Commonwealth 
                                                          
Brennan J, Deane J and Gaudron J and 526 per Dawson J and Toohey J; Nintendo Co Ltd v 
Centronics Systems Pty Ltd 1994 HCA 27 para 5 per Dawson J. See also Allen 2000 Sydney LR 
375-376. In South African law it is also possible to have expropriations where the ultimate 
beneficiary is someone other than the state: see Van der Vyver 2012 De Jure 131, who cites Offit 
Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation 2010 4 SA 242 (SCA) paras 14-18 and 
compare s 4 of the Expropriation Bill of 15 March 2013. 
151  Compare the first step in the FNB methodology, which also investigates whether the affected 
interest amounts to constitutional property: see First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister 
of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
152  JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia 2012 HCA 43 para 29 per French CJ, para 169 
per Hayne J and Bell J; Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Chaffey 2007 231 CLR 651 
664 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow J, Hayne J and Crennan J; Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v The 
Commonwealth of Australia 1994 179 CLR 155 184 per Deane J and Gaudron J; Georgiadis v 
Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation 1994 179 CLR 297 303-304 per Mason 
CJ, Deane J and Gaudron J. For instance, a contractual right – amounting to a chose in action in 
Australian law – is property for the purposes of s 51(xxxi): see Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v 
The Commonwealth of Australia 1994 179 CLR 155 172 per Mason CJ; Georgiadis v Australian and 
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation 1994 179 CLR 297 311 per Brennan J. A similar 
approach is likely to be followed in South African law, especially after National Credit Regulator v 
Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC), where the South African Constitutional Court held that a claim for 
the restitution of money sourced in the law of unjustified enrichment is also "property" for the 
purposes of s 25. See further Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 60-70 for a more 
comprehensive analysis of what constitutes "property" under s 51(xxxi). For a broader discussion 
which also focuses on other Commonwealth countries, see Allen Commonwealth Constitutions 119-
161. 
153  Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia 1994 179 CLR 155 184-185 per 
Deane J and Gaudron J; Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation 
1994 179 CLR 297 303 per Mason CJ, Deane J and Gaudron J; The Commonwealth of Australia v 
The State of Tasmania 1983 158 CLR 1 145 per Mason J. 
154  JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia 2012 HCA 43 para 30 per French CJ; Mutual 
Pools & Staff Pty Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia 1994 179 CLR 155 184-185 per Deane 
J and Gaudron J; Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation 1994 179 
CLR 297 304 per Mason CJ, Deane J and Gaudron J, 311 per Brennan J; Australian Tape 
Manufacturers Association Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia 1993 177 CLR 480 528 per 
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(or another person) must at least obtain some identifiable benefit or advantage 
relating to the ownership or use of property to satisfy this requirement, no matter how 
slight or insubstantial it may be. 155  It is worth emphasising that what the 
Commonwealth acquires need not be exactly the same as what was lost by the 
affected party.156 In Australian law the acquisition requirement is satisfied as long as 
the Commonwealth or someone else obtains some "benefit" or "receipt" and does not 
merely amount to a loss suffered by the affected party.157 This clarifies why the 
extinguishment of a limited real right, such as a long-term lease, amounts to the 
acquisition of property. In Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v The Commonwealth of 
Australia158 (Mutual Pools) it was held – by way of obiter dictum – that even though 
the reversioner (or grantor of a leasehold interest) does not acquire the actual 
leasehold interest upon its extinguishment, he or she does then acquire the benefit of 
having additional or increased rights in the leased property.159 These rights, essentially 
                                                          
Dawson J and Toohey J; The Commonwealth of Australia v The State of Tasmania 1983 158 CLR 
1 145-146 per Mason J, 181-182 per Murphy J, 247-248 per Brennan J and 283 per Deane J.  
155  JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia 2012 HCA 43 paras 144-154 per Gummow J, 
paras 169-173 per Hayne J and Bell J; Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v The Commonwealth of 
Australia 1994 179 CLR 155 173 per Mason CJ, 185 per Deane J and Gaudron J; Georgiadis v 
Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation 1994 179 CLR 297 304 per Mason CJ, 
Deane J and Gaudron J; The Commonwealth of Australia v The State of Tasmania 1983 158 CLR 
1 145 per Mason J.  
156  Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation 1994 179 CLR 297 304-
305 per Mason CJ, Deane J and Gaudron J. See also Attorney-General for the Northern Territory 
v Chaffey 2007 231 CLR 651 663 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow J, Hayne J and Crennan J; Australian 
Capital Television Pty Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia; The State of New South Wales v 
The Commonwealth of Australia 1993 177 CLR 106 165-166 per Brennan J and 196-198 per 
Dawson J. Compare Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 
58. 
157  See the cases cited in the previous fn and compare with the position in pre-constitutional South 
African expropriation law discussed in s 3.2 above. 
158  Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia 1994 179 CLR 155. 
159  Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia 1994 179 CLR 155 194-195 per 
Dawson J and Toohey J. Compare Hopkins and Hofmeyr 2003 SALJ 51, who describe expropriation 
as a situation where "the state derives use or benefit from the property which it has acquired". 
Interestingly, Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman 541 describe 
expropriation as the termination of entitlements held by a property holder with the concomitant 
acquisition of benefits by the state, which description is analogous to the position in Australian law 
discussed in the main text. The authors (at fn 203) state that "[t]he entitlements [or benefits] 
acquired by the state may be different from those lost by the individual holder", which underscores 
why the expropriation of long-term leases amounts to state acquisition. See further s 3.2 above 
and as well as Mostert 2003 SAJHR 572. 
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being the entitlements to use and enjoy the property, are proprietary in nature in that 
they relate to the use of the property.160  
In the light of this reasoning it has been held that the extinguishment of a claim (such 
as a debt) can also amount to acquisition if it is a vested right and the extinguishment 
results in a direct benefit or financial gain for the Commonwealth, by for instance not 
having to pay it.161 The locus classicus concerning the extinguishment of a monetary 
claim in Australian law is Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications 
Corporation 162  (Georgiadis). This case turned on whether or not legislation that 
extinguished the plaintiff's common law right to claim damages from the 
Commonwealth for a work-related injury without providing just terms infringed section 
51(xxxi). The majority held that the applicable provision resulted in the acquisition of 
property, even though the plaintiff's claim was merely extinguished and was thus not 
                                                          
160  Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia 1994 179 CLR 155 194-195 per 
Dawson J and Toohey J. This obiter dictum confirms why the expropriation of limited real rights in 
cases like Beckenstrater amounts to state acquisition of property in South African law. See further 
British Columbia v Tener 1985 17 DLR 4th 1; 32 LCR 340, which concerned legislation that 
prevented the holders of certain mineral rights in state-owned land from exploiting those rights. 
The Supreme Court of Canada (paras 39-41 per Wilson J) described these rights, which include 
the entitlement to sever minerals from the land to which they relate and to enter upon the land 
for this purpose, as being similar to profits à prendre or personal servitudes. The question before 
the Court was if preventing the mineral right holders from exercising these rights amounted to 
acquisition (and therefore expropriation in the Canadian context) of property by the Crown. Wilson 
J (para 68) held that under the present circumstances the mineral rights (or servitudes) were 
extinguished by the Crown (or state), as the state – as owner of the land – cannot hold a servitude 
in its own property. As to whether this extinction constituted acquisition, she held as follows: "This, 
however, does not mean that the acquisition of an outstanding profit à prendre held by someone 
else does not enure to his benefit. By depriving the holder of the profit of his interest – his right 
to go on the land for the purpose of severing the minerals and making them his own – the owner 
of the fee [namely the Crown] has effectively removed the encumbrance from his land. It would, 
in my view, be quite unconscionable to say that this cannot constitute an expropriation [by way of 
acquisition] in some technical, legalistic sense. Indeed … the doctrine of merger would appear to 
operate so as to make the respondent's loss the appellant's gain." (Own emphasis.) Against this 
background it was found that the interference at hand resulted in state acquisition and therefore 
the expropriation of property. The Court's reference to the acquisition of a benefit by the state 
under these circumstances is analogous to ownership reverting back to its full or unencumbered 
state, even though Canadian law, like Australian law, is an Anglo-American legal system and 
therefore regards ownership as a bundle of sticks: see the sources mentioned in fn 108 above. 
See also Allen Commonwealth Constitutions 170, especially fn 28. 
161  Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation 1994 179 CLR 297 305 per 
Mason CJ, Deane J and Gaudron J and 311 per Brennan J. Compare Hewlett v Minster of Finance 
1982 1 SA 490 (ZS), where the Zimbabwe Supreme Court arrived at the opposite conclusion. 
Hewlett is one of the foreign judgments on which the Harksen court relied: see Harksen v Lane 
1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 33. See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 485-489; Van der 
Walt Constitutional Property Law 152-153; and Van der Walt and Botha 1998 SAPL 20-22 for 
criticism of the Hewlett decision. 
162  Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation 1994 179 CLR 297. 
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"acquired" by the Commonwealth. The High Court reasoned that the Commonwealth 
received the benefit of being released from its liability to pay the debt, which allowed 
it to keep the money it would otherwise have had to pay out. Brennan J described this 
benefit as being the "correlative" of the plaintiff's claim.163  
However, it must be emphasised that not any benefit will satisfy the acquisition 
requirement – in JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia 164  (the Plain 
Packaging case) the High Court unambiguously declared that the benefit or receipt 
must be of a proprietary nature.165 This case was about legislation that prohibits 
tobacco companies from using their trade marks on tobacco products and obliges 
them to put large health warnings and helpline information on these products. The 
plaintiffs argued that the applicable statute effected an acquisition of their intellectual 
property rights and goodwill contrary to section 51(xxxi). The majority found that the 
effect of the legislation on the plaintiffs' immaterial property rights did not amount to 
an acquisition of a proprietary benefit by the Commonwealth.166 The Court reasoned 
that the plaintiffs merely lost their right to use the packaging they saw fit and that no 
one (including the Commonwealth) acquired the right to use the space on the 
packaging for purposes of advertisement or marketing. Gummow J, as part of the 
majority, distinguished two species of "benefit" in this context.167 The first is when 
what is acquired corresponds to what is taken, such as when the state expropriates 
ownership in land. The second instance pertains to scenarios where the legislation 
                                                          
163  Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation 1994 179 CLR 297 311 per 
Brennan J. See alsoTheophanous v The Commonwealth 2006 225 CLR 101 113-114 per Gleeson 
CJ; Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia 1994 179 CLR 155 176 per 
Brennan J; The Commonwealth of Australia v The State of Tasmania 1983 158 CLR 1 283 per 
Deane J. See further Allen Commonwealth Constitutions 171 and fn 31 as well as Allen 2000 
Sydney LR 356. Compare Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) 
paras 58, the discussion in fn 136 as well as the surrounding main text. 
164  JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia 2012 HCA 43. 
165  See JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia 2012 HCA 43 para 42 per French CJ, paras 
131, 144-154 per Gummow J and especially paras 169-173 per Hayne J and Bell J, which clarifies 
the position of Deane J in The Commonwealth of Australia v The State of Tasmania 1983 158 CLR 
1 283, 286-287 as well as that of Deane J and Gaudron J in Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v The 
Commonwealth of Australia 1994 179 CLR 155 185. See also Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v 
The Commonwealth of Australia 1994 179 CLR 155 176 per Brennan J; Georgiadis v Australian 
and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation 1994 179 CLR 297 311 per Brennan J.  
166  JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia 2012 HCA 43 paras 43-44 per French CJ, paras 
144-158 per Gummow J and paras 180-191 per Hayne J and Bell J. 
167  JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia 2012 HCA 43 para 153. 
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modifies or extinguishes existing rights, which then results in a countervailing benefit 
or advantage of a proprietary nature for the Commonwealth, as was for instance the 
case in Georgiadis.168 The fact that no one obtained a proprietary benefit in the rights 
in question, coupled with the fact that they are sourced in legislation and therefore 
more susceptible to modification,169 led the majority to find against the plaintiffs. The 
Court acknowledged that the Commonwealth had, however, obtained the benefit of 
having increased protection of public health through enacting the legislation, but found 
that such a benefit is not proprietary in nature. 
The source of the affected property right is therefore also important when considering 
if acquisition occurred, 170  especially in situations where the affected right is not 
sourced in the common law but in legislation (such as in the Plain Packaging case). 
These rights are by their nature more susceptible to modification or extinguishment, 
and hence the application of statutes which modify or alter them will typically not 
amount to the acquisition of property.171 However, these rights – being property – still 
qualify for protection under the property clause, although their source and nature will 
be scrutinised more closely than in cases concerning common-law rights to determine 
whether acquisition occurred.172 Two High Court judgments set out the principles in 
this context, namely Health Insurance Commission v Peverill 173  (Peverill) and 
Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Chaffey174 (Chaffey). The legal questions 
in these cases were whether or not the application of legislation, which permitted 
retrospective reductions of monetary claims sourced in different statutes amounted to 
                                                          
168  Although Georgiadis concerned a claim for damages which was sourced in common law. 
169  I expand on the importance of this factor in the next paragraph. 
170  This factor bears a striking resemblance to the first factor (ie the source of the right) listed by 
Mogoeng CJ in Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 64 for 
establishing the meaning of "state acquisition". 
171  JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia 2012 HCA 43 paras 29-30 per French CJ; 
Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Chaffey 2007 231 CLR 651 663-666 per Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow J, Hayne J and Crennan J and 668 per Kirby J; Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas 
Telecommunications Corporation 1994 179 CLR 297 305-306 per Mason CJ, Deane J and Gaudron 
J; Health Insurance Commission v Peverill 1994 179 CLR 226 236-237 per Mason CJ, Deane J and 
Gaudron J. 
172  JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia 2012 HCA 43 paras 29-30 per French CJ and the 
sources referred to there; Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Chaffey 2007 231 CLR 651 
663-666 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow J, Hayne J and Crennan J, 668 per Kirby J and 671 per Callinan 
J. 
173  Health Insurance Commission v Peverill 1994 179 CLR 226. 
174  Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Chaffey 2007 231 CLR 651. 
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acquisition of property. The High Court on both occasions rejected the argument that 
it does by holding that there was no "acquisition."175 Two considerations were decisive 
in this regard, namely that the rights in question were (i) adjustable (and indeed 
adjusted and changed from time to time) and (ii) inherently susceptible to variation in 
terms of the provisions of the applicable statutes.176 Whether an interference (or even 
extinguishment) of property rights sourced in legislation amounts to acquisition 
therefore depends on an interplay between these two considerations.  
To summarise, for there to be an acquisition it is not necessary that what the 
Commonwealth or someone else acquires should be exactly similar to what was lost 
by the affected party. This requirement will be met as long as what is acquired entails 
some identifiable benefit or advantage which is of a proprietary nature, which will be 
the case when the benefit relates to the ownership or use of property. This position is 
analogous to pre-constitutional South African law as well as to the meaning afforded 
to state acquisition in Agri SA, where it was held that the state had to acquire 
ownership of or at least the right to exploit the affected mineral rights. In this context 
Australian law confirms why the expropriation of limited real rights (either through 
their creation or extinguishment) results in state acquisition. It also shows why the 
extinguishment of claims which have not yet come up for decision in South African 
law can amount to the acquisition of property under certain circumstances.177  
An important factor for establishing whether acquisition occurred in Australian law, 
consideration of which could inform Mogoeng CJ's first factor to be used in determining 
the meaning of acquisition, is the source of the property right. This factor entails that 
                                                          
175  The majority in Health Insurance Commission v Peverill 1994 179 CLR 226 was not unanimous on 
this point, though. Mason CJ, Deane J and Gaudron J (236-237) decided that the affected rights 
amounted to "property", but held that there was no "acquisition" as meant in s 51(xxxi). Dawson 
J (250-251) and McHugh J (265-268) appear to have arrived at more or less the same conclusion. 
Toohey J (256) found that even though the affected interest was a chose in action and therefore 
property, that the impugned legislation did not affect an "acquisition of property" by the 
Commonwealth. Brennan J (243-244), on the other hand, held that the interest at stake did not 
amount to "property" and that s 51(xxxi) was therefore not engaged. See further in this regard 
Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 64-65. The majority in Attorney-General for the 
Northern Territory v Chaffey 2007 231 CLR 651 appears to be ad idem that the applicable 
legislation did not result in the acquisition of property.  
176  Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Chaffey 2007 231 CLR 651 667-671 per Kirby J; 
Health Insurance Commission v Peverill 1994 179 CLR 226 237 per Mason CJ, Deane J and Gaudron 
J. See generally JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia 2012 HCA 43. 
177  Compare the discussion in fn 161 above, as well as in the surrounding main text. 
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legislation which modifies or even extinguishes property rights sourced in statute is 
less likely to result in acquisition than would be the case if it originated in common 
law. In this regard the finding in the Plain Packaging case seems to support the Agri 
SA court's conclusion that the MPRDA's effect on Sebenza's old order mineral rights 
did not amount to state acquisition. Even though old order mineral rights originated 
from landownership and were therefore common-law rights, it is trite that these rights 
were heavily regulated by statute from early on. 178  In terms of the second 
consideration set out in Peverill and Chaffey, it could perhaps be argued that the 
manner in which mineral rights could be acquired, held and exploited was inherently 
susceptible to variation by the state. When viewed from this angle the MPRDA is 
merely the latest step in a long series of mineral legislation which regulates how the 
holders of (old order) mineral rights may acquire, hold and exploit them.179 This 
conclusion, coupled with the fact that neither the South African state nor anyone else 
acquired ownership or the right to exploit the affected mineral rights or entitlements 
upon the commencement of the MPRDA, appears to confirm the majority's finding that 
no state acquisition took place.180  
The meaning of acquisition in Australian law therefore broadly corresponds to the 
position in South African law and clarifies many of the uncertainties pertaining to the 
meaning of state acquisition concerning the expropriation of limited real rights. 
Australian law also informs Mogoeng CJ's first factor for establishing the meaning of 
acquisition, which does not appear to have received attention in Agri SA. However, it 
must be emphasised that the mere fact that a property interference amounts to 
acquisition does not necessarily mean it engages section 51(xxxi). In other words, the 
fact that acquisition took place does not categorically indicate that the interference 
results in the "expropriation" of property. Here the Australian High Court's approach 
corresponds to the position in pre-constitutional South African law and differs from 
                                                          
178  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 404; Mostert Mineral Law 78, 93-94, 113-115, 136, 140; 
Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell LR 384-393. 
179  See the sources referred to in the previous fn. 
180  However, another benefit that the South African state acquired (over time) is being able to grant 
new rights to minerals in cases like that of Sebenza where unused old order mineral rights were 
extinguished by the MPRDA upon non-conversion: see the main text surrounding fn 138. Whether 
or not the acquisition of this benefit amounts to the acquisition of property is addressed in ss 1.4 
and 2.3 of Part II of this article. 
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Mogoeng CJ's effect-based test – for the acquisition to amount to expropriation which 
requires just terms (or compensation) it must also be an acquisition with respect to 
section 51(xxxi). Part II of this article expands on the importance of this qualification 
by identifying the shortcomings of confining the expropriation inquiry merely to 
whether or not the state acquired property.181 It then considers how a purpose-based 
approach towards the expropriation question – as exemplified by Harksen and 
informed by Australian law – is able to avoid the pitfalls in this regard. 
[To be concluded] 
  
                                                          
181  As alluded to in the main text surrounding fn 131 above, the Harksen judgment might have gone 
the other way if Goldstone J had only considered the effect of the infringement on deciding the 
expropriation question. 
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